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In this paper w e propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizable 
group o f  epistem ological projects— a group which includes much o f  what 
has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition— would be seriously 
undermined if  one or more o f a cluster o f empirical hypotheses about epis­
temic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out 
in section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is still out, there is now 
a substantial body o f  evidence suggesting that som e o f those empirical 
hypotheses are  true. Much o f  this evidence derives from an ongoing series 
o f experimental studies o f epistemic intuitions that we have been conduct­
ing. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in section 3. In 
light o f these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epis­
tem ological projects in question to either explain why the truth o f  the 
hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light o f the 
evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are
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false. In section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we’ll con­
sider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing 
might reply to our challenge. Our goal is not to offer a conclusive argument 
demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are 
untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument. For far too 
long, epistemologists who rely heavily on epistemic intuitions have pro­
ceeded as though they could simply ignore the empirical hypotheses we will 
set out. We will be well satisfied if we succeed in making a plausible case 
for the claim that this approach is no longer acceptable.
To start, it will be useful to sketch a brief—and perhaps somewhat 
idiosyncratic—taxonomy of epistemological projects. With the aid of this 
taxonomy we will try to “locate in philosophical space” (as Wilfrid Sellars 
used to say) those epistemological projects which, we maintain, are threat­
ened by the evidence we will present. There are at least four distinct, though 
related, projects that have occupied the attention of epistemologists. 
Following Richard Samuels,1 we’ll call them the Normative Project, the 
Descriptive Project, the Evaluative Project, and the Ameliorative Project.
The Normative Project, which we’re inclined to think is the most philo­
sophically central of the four, attempts to establish norms to guide our epis­
temic efforts. Some of these norms may be explicitly regulative, specifying 
which ways of going about the quest for knowledge should be pursued and 
which should not. This articulation of regulative norms is one of the more 
venerable of philosophical undertakings, going back at least to Descartes’s 
Regulae and evident in the work of Mill, Popper, and many other important 
figures in the history of philosophy, and it continues in philosophy today. 
For example, when Alvin Goldman chastises intemalism for being unable 
to provide us with “Doxastic Decision Principles,” he is challenging the 
ability of intemalism to pull its weight in this aspect of the Normative 
Project.2 The Normative Project also aims to articulate what might be called 
valuational norms, which attempt to answer questions like: What is our 
epistemic good? and How should we prefer to structure our doxastic lives? 
One may not be able to generate regulative principles from the answers pro­
vided; rather, the answers tell us at what target the regulative principles 
should aim.
The Descriptive Project can have a variety of targets, the two most 
common being epistemic concepts and epistemic language. When concepts 
are the target, the goal is to describe (or “analyze”) the epistemic concepts 
that some group of people actually invoke. When pursued by epistemolo­
gists (rather than linguists or anthropologists), the group in question is typ­
ically characterized rather vaguely by using the first-person plural. They are 
“our” concepts, the ones that “we” use. Work in this tradition has led to a 
large literature attempting to analyze concepts like knowledge, justification, 
warrant, and rationality.3 When language is the focus of the Descriptive
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Project, the goal is to describe the way some group of people use epistemic 
language or to analyze the meaning of their epistemic terms. Here again, the 
group is almost invariably “us.”
Many epistemologists think that there are important links between the 
Normative and Descriptive Projects. Indeed, we suspect that these (putative) 
links go a long way toward explaining why philosophers think the Descrip­
tive Project is so important. In epistemology, knowledge is “the good stuff” 
and to call a belief an instance of knowledge is to pay it one of the highest 
compliments an epistemologist can bestow.4 Thus terms like “knowledge,” 
“justification,” “warrant,” etc., and the concepts they express are themselves 
plausibly regarded as implicitly normative. Moreover, many philosophers 
hold that sentences invoking epistemic terms have explicitly normative con­
sequences. So, for example, “S’s belief that p is an instance of knowledge” 
might plausibly be taken to entail “Ceteris paribus, S ought to believe that 
p” or perhaps “Ceteris paribus, it is a good thing for S to believe that p. 5 
For reasons that will emerge, we are more than a bit skeptical about the 
alleged links between the Descriptive and Normative Projects. For the time 
being, however, we will leave the claim that the two projects are connected 
unchallenged.
The Evaluative Project tries to assess how well or poorly people’s 
actual belief-forming practices accord with the norms specified in the 
Normative Project. To do this, of course, another sort of descriptive effort is 
required. Before we can say how well or poorly people are doing at the 
business of belief formation and revision, we have to say in some detail how 
they actually go about the process of belief formation and revision.6 The 
Ameliorative Project presupposes that we don’t all come out with the high­
est possible score in the assessment produced by the Evaluative Project, and 
asks how we can improve the way we go about the business of belief for­
mation. In this paper our primary focus will be on the Normative Project 
and on versions of the Descriptive Project which assume that the Descrip­
tive and Normative Projects are linked in something like the way sketched 
above.
II. INTUITION-DRIVEN ROM ANTICISM  AND THE 
NORMATIVITY PROBLEM
A. EPISTEMIC ROM ANTICISM  AND INTUITION-DRIVEN ROMANTICISM 
A central question that the Normative Project tries to answer is: How ought 
we to go about the business o f  belief formation and revision? How are we to 
go about finding an answer to this question? And once an answer has been 
proposed, how are we to assess it? If two theorists offer different answers,
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how can we determine which one is better? Philosophers who have pur­
sued the Normative Project have used a variety of methods or strategies. 
In this section we want to begin by describing one very influential family 
of strategies.
The family we have in mind belongs to a larger group of strategies 
which (just to be provocative) we propose to call Epistem ic Romanticism. 
One central idea of nineteenth-century Romanticism was that our real 
selves, the essence of our identity, is implanted within us, and that to dis­
cover who we really are we need but let that real identity emerge. Epistemic 
Romanticism assumes something rather similar about epistemic norms. 
According to Epistemic Romanticism, knowledge of the correct epistemic 
norms (or information that can lead to knowledge of the correct norms) is 
implanted within us in some way, and with the proper process of self-explo­
ration we can discover them. As we read him, Plato was an early exponent 
of this kind of Romanticism about matters normative (and about much else 
besides). So Epistem ic Platonism  might be another (perhaps equally 
provocative) label for this group of strategies for discovering or testing epis­
temic norms.
There are various ways in which the basic idea of Epistemic Romanti­
cism can be elaborated. The family of strategies that we want to focus on all 
accord a central role to what we will call epistemic intuitions. Thus we will 
call this family of strategies Intuition-Driven Romanticism  (or IDR). As we 
use the notion, an epistemic intuition is simply a spontaneous judgment 
about the epistemic properties of some specific case—a judgment for which 
the person making the judgment may be able to offer no plausible justi­
fication. To count as an Intuition-Driven Romantic strategy for discovering 
or testing epistemic norms, the following three conditions must be 
satisfied:
(i) The strategy must take epistemic intuitions as data or input. (It 
can also exploit various other sorts of data.)
(ii) It must produce, as output, explicitly or implicitly normative 
claims or principles about matters epistemic. Explicitly norma­
tive claims include regulative claims about how we ought to go 
about the business of belief formation, claims about the relative 
merits of various strategies for belief formation, and evaluative 
claims about the merits of various epistemic situations. Implicitly 
normative claims include claims to the effect that one or 
another process of belief formation leads to justified beliefs or 
to real knowledge or that a doxastic structure of a certain kind 
amounts to real knowledge.
(iii) The output of the strategy must depend, in part, on the epis­
temic intuitions it takes as input. If provided with significantly 
different intuitions, the strategy must yield significantly differ­
ent output.7
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Perhaps the most familiar examples of Intuition-Driven Romanticism 
are various versions of the reflective equilibrium strategy in which (to para­
phrase Goodman slightly) “a [normative] rule is amended if it yields an 
inference we are [intuitively] unwilling to accept [and] an inference is 
rejected if it violates a [normative] rule we are [intuitively] unwilling to 
amend.”8 In a much discussed paper called “Can Human Irrationality Be 
Experimentally Demonstrated,” L. J. Cohen proposes a variation on 
Goodman’s strategy as a way of determining what counts as rational or nor­
matively appropriate reasoning.9 It is of some importance to note that there 
are many ways in which the general idea of a reflective equilibrium process 
can be spelled out. Some philosophers, including Cohen, advocate a “nar­
row” reflective equilibrium strategy. Others advocate a “wide” reflective 
equilibrium strategy. And both of these alternatives can be elaborated in var­
ious ways.10 Moreover, the details are often quite important since different 
versions of the reflective equilibrium strategy may yield different outputs, 
even when provided with exactly the same input.
Another example of the IDR strategy can be found in Alvin Goldman’s 
important and influential book, Epistemology and Cognition (1986). A cen­
tral goal of epistemology, Goldman argues, is to develop a theory that will 
specify which of our beliefs are epistemically justified and which are not, 
and a fundamental step in constructing such a theory will be to articulate a 
system of rules or principles evaluating the justificatory status of beliefs. 
These rules, which Goldman calls J-rules, will specify permissible ways in 
which cognitive agents may go about the business of forming or updating 
their beliefs. They “permit or prohibit beliefs, directly or indirectly, as a 
function of some states, relations, or processes of the cognizer.” 11 But, of 
course, different theorists may urge different and incompatible sets of J- 
rules. So in order to decide whether a proposed system of J-rules is correct, 
we must appeal to a higher criterion—Goldman calls it “a criterion of right­
ness”—which will specify a “set of conditions that are necessary and suffi­
cient for a set of J-rules to be right.” 12 But now the theoretical disputes 
emerge at a higher level, for different theorists have suggested very differ­
ent criteria of rightness. Indeed, as Goldman notes, an illuminating taxon­
omy of epistemological theories can be generated by classifying them on the 
basis of the sort of criterion of rightness they endorse. So how are we to go 
about deciding among these various criteria of rightness? The answer, 
Goldman maintains, is that the correct criterion of rightness is the one that 
comports with the conception of justification that is “embraced by everyday 
thought and language.” 13 To test a criterion, we consider the judgments it 
would entail about specific cases, and we test these judgments against our 
“pretheoretic intuition.” “A criterion is supported to the extent that implied 
judgments accord with such intuitions and weakened to the extent that they 
do not.” 14
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The examples we have mentioned so far are hardly the only examples 
of Intuition-Driven Romanticism. Indeed, we think a plausible case can be 
made that a fair amount of what goes on in normative epistemology can be 
classified as Intuition-Driven Romanticism. Moreover, to the extent that it 
is assumed to have normative implications, much of what has been written 
in descriptive epistemology in recent decades also counts as Intuition- 
Driven Romanticism. For example, just about all of the vast literature that 
arose in response to Gettier’s classic paper uses intuitions about specific 
cases to test proposed analyses of the concept of knowledge.15
For many purposes, the details of an IDR strategy—the specific ways 
in which it draws inferences from intuitions and other data—will be of enor­
mous importance. But since our goal is to raise a problem for all IDR strate­
gies, the exact details of how they work will play no role in our argument. 
Thus, for our purposes, an IDR strategy can be viewed as a “black box” 
which takes intuitions (and perhaps other data) as input and produces 
implicitly or explicitly normative claims as output. The challenge we are 
about to raise is, we claim, a problem for IDR accounts no matter what goes 
on within the black box.
B. THE NORMATIVITY PROBLEM
Reflective equilibrium strategies and other Intuition-Driven Romantic strate­
gies all yield as outputs claims that putatively have normative force. These 
outputs tell us how people ought to go about forming and revising their 
beliefs, which belief-forming strategies yield genuinely justified beliefs, 
which beliefs are warranted, which count as real knowledge rather than 
mere opinion, etc. But there is a problem lurking here—we’ll call it the 
Normativity Problem: What reason is there to think that the output of one or 
another of these Intuition-Driven Romantic strategies has real (as opposed 
to putative) normative force? Why should we care about the normative pro­
nouncements produced by these strategies? Why should we try to do what 
these outputs claim we ought to do in matters epistemic? Why, in short, 
should we take any of this stuff seriously?
We don’t think that there is any good solution to the Normativity 
Problem for Intuition-Driven Romanticism or indeed for any other version 
of Romanticism in epistemology. And because there is no solution to the 
Normativity Problem, we think that the entire tradition of Epistemic Romanti­
cism has been a very bad idea. These, obviously, are very big claims and 
this is not the place to mount a detailed argument for all of them. We do, 
however, want to rehearse one consideration, first raised in Stich’s book, 
The Fragmentation o f  Reason.16 We think it lends some plausibility to the 
claim that satisfying solutions to the Normativity Problem for Intuition- 
Driven Romanticism are going to be hard to find. It will also help to moti­
vate the empirical studies we will recount in the section to follow.
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What Stich noted is that the following situation seems perfectly possi­
ble. There might be a group of people who reason and form beliefs in ways 
that are significantly different from the way we do. Moreover, these people 
might also have epistemic intuitions that are significantly different from 
ours. More specifically, they might have epistemic intuitions which, when 
plugged into your favorite Intuition-Driven Romantic black box, yield the 
conclusion that their strategies of reasoning and belief formation lead to 
epistemic states that are rational (or justified, or of the sort that yield gen­
uine knowledge—pick your favorite normative epistemic notion here). If 
this is right, then it looks like the IDR strategy for answering normative 
epistemic questions might sanction any of a wide variety of regulative and 
valuational norms. And that sounds like bad news for an advocate of the 
IDR strategy, since the strategy doesn’t tell us what we really want to know. 
It doesn’t tell us how we should go about the business of forming and revis­
ing our beliefs. One might, of course, insist that the normative principles 
that should be followed are the ones that are generated when we put our 
intuitions into the IDR black box. But it is less than obvious (to put it 
mildly) how this move could be defended. Why should we privilege our 
intuitions rather than the intuitions of some other group?
One objection that was occasionally raised in response to this challenge 
focused on the fact that the groups conjured in Stich’s argument are just 
philosophical fictions.17 While it may well be logically possible that there 
are groups of people whose reasoning patterns and epistemic intuitions dif­
fer systematically from our own, there is no reason to suppose that it is 
nomologically or psychologically possible. And without some reason to 
think that such people are psychologically possible, the objection continued, 
the thought experiment does not pose a problem that the defender of the 
IDR strategy needs to take seriously. We are far from convinced by this 
objection, though we are prepared to concede that the use of nomologically 
or psychologically impossible cases in normative epistemology raises some 
deep and difficult issues. Thus, for argument’s sake, we are prepared to con­
cede that a plausible case might be made for privileging normative claims 
based on actual intuitions over normative claims based on intuitions that are 
merely logically possible. But what if the people imagined in the thought 
experiment are not just logically possible, but psychologically possible? 
Indeed, what if they are not merely psychologically possible but real—and 
to all appearances normal and flourishing? Under those circumstances, we 
maintain, it is hard to see how advocates of an IDR strategy can maintain 
that their intuitions have any special standing or that the normative princi­
ples these intuitions generate when plugged into their favorite IDR black 
box should be privileged over the normative principles that would be gen­
erated if we plugged the other people’s intuitions into the same IDR black 
box. In the section to follow we will argue that these “what ifs” are not ju st
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“what ifs.” There really are people—normal, flourishing people—whose 
epistemic intuitions are systematically different from “ours.”
III. CULTURAL VARIATION IN  EPISTEM IC INTUITIONS
A. NISBETT AND HAIDT: SOME SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE 
Our suspicion that people like those imagined in Stich’s thought experiment 
might actually exist was first provoked by the results of two recent research 
programs in psychology. In one of these, Richard Nisbett and his collabora­
tors have shown that there are large and systematic differences between East 
Asians and Westerners18 on a long list of basic cognitive processes, includ­
ing perception, attention, and memory. These groups also differ in the way 
they go about describing, predicting, and explaining events; in the way they 
categorize objects; and in the way they revise beliefs in the face of new 
arguments and evidence. This work makes it very plausible that the first part 
of Stich’s thought-experiment is more than just a logical possibility. There 
really are people whose reasoning and belief-forming strategies are very dif­
ferent from ours. Indeed, there are over a billion of them!
Though space does not permit us to offer a detailed account of the dif­
ferences that Nisbett and his colleagues found, a few brief notes will be use­
ful in motivating the studies we will describe later is this section. According 
to Nisbett and his colleagues, the differences “can be loosely grouped 
together under the heading of holistic vs. analytic thought.” Holistic thought, 
which predominates among East Asians, is characterized as “involving an 
orientation to the context or field as a whole, including attention to relation­
ships between a focal object and the field, and a preference for explaining 
and predicting events on the basis of such relationships.” Analytic thought, 
the prevailing pattern among Westerners, is characterized as “involving 
detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to focus on attributes 
of the object in order to assign it to categories, and a preference for using 
rules about the categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior.” 19 
One concomitant of East Asian holistic thought is the tendency to focus on 
chronological rather than causal patterns in describing and recalling events. 
Westerners, by contrast, focus on causal patterns in these tasks.20 Westerners 
also have a stronger sense of agency and independence, while East Asians 
have a much stronger commitment to social harmony. In East Asian society, 
the individual feels very much a part of a large and complex social 
organism where behavioral prescriptions must be followed and role obliga­
tions adhered to scrupulously.21
The second research program that led us to suspect there might actually 
be people like those in Stich’s thought experiment was the work Jonathan
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Haidt and his collaborators.22 These investigators were interested in explor­
ing the extent to which moral intuitions about events in which no one is 
harmed track judgments about disgust in people from different cultural and 
socioeconomic groups. For their study they constructed a set of brief stories 
about victimless activities that were intended to trigger the emotion of dis­
gust. They presented these stories to subjects using a structured interview 
technique designed to determine whether the subjects found the activities 
described to be disgusting and also to elicit the subjects’ moral intuitions 
about the activities. As an illustration, here is a story describing actions 
which people in all the groups studied found (not surprisingly) to be quite 
disgusting:
A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead 
chicken. But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual inter­
course with it. Then he cooks it and eats it.
The interviews were administered to both high and low socioeconomic sta­
tus (SES) subjects in Philadelphia (USA) and in two cities in Brazil. Perhaps 
the most surprising finding in this study was that there are large differences 
in moral intuitions between social classes. Indeed, in most cases the differ­
ence between social classes was significantly greater than the difference 
between Brazilian and American subjects of the same SES. Of course we 
haven’t yet told you what the differences in moral intuitions were, though 
you should be able to predict them by noting your own moral intuitions. 
(Hint: If you are reading this article, you count as high SES.) Not to keep 
you in suspense, low SES subjects tend to think that the man who has sex 
with the chicken is doing something that is seriously morally wrong; high 
SES subjects don’t. Much the same pattern was found with the other sce­
narios used in the study.
B. FOUR HYPOTHESES
For our purposes, Haidt’s work, like Nisbett’s, is only suggestive. Nisbett 
gives us reason to think that people in different cultural groups exploit very 
different belief-forming strategies. Haidt’s work demonstrates that people in 
different SES groups have systematically different moral intuitions. Neither 
investigator explored the possibility that there might be differences in epis­
temic intuitions in different groups. However, the results they reported were 
enough to convince us that the following pair of hypotheses might be true, 
and that it was worth the effort to find out:
Hypothesis 1: Epistemic intuitions vary from culture to culture.
Hypothesis 2: Epistemic intuitions vary from one socioeconomic 
group to another.
To these two experimentally inspired hypotheses we added two more that 
were suggested by anecdotal rather than experimental evidence. It has often
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seemed to us that students’ epistemic intuitions change as they take more 
philosophy courses, and we have often suspected that we and our colleagues 
were, in effect, teaching neophyte philosophers to have intuitions that are in 
line with those of more senior members of the profession. Or perhaps we are 
not modifying intuitions at all but simply weeding out students whose intu­
itions are not mainstream. If either of these is the case, then the intuitions 
that “we” use in our philosophical work are not those of the man and 
woman in the street, but those of a highly trained and self-selecting com­
munity. These speculations led to:
Hypothesis 3: Epistemic intuitions vary as a function of how many 
philosophy courses a person has had.
It also sometimes seems that the order in which cases are presented to peo­
ple can have substantial effects on people’s epistemic intuitions. This hunch 
is reinforced by some intriguing work on neural networks suggesting that a 
variety of learning strategies may be “path dependent.”23 If this hunch is 
correct, the pattern of intuitions that people offer on a series of cases might 
well differ systematically as a function of the order in which the cases are 
presented. This suggested our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Epistemic intuitions depend, in part, on the order in 
which cases are presented.
Moreover, it might well be the case that some of the results of order effects 
are very hard to modify.24
If any one of these four hypotheses turns out to be true then, we main­
tain, it will pose a serious problem for the advocate of Intuition-Driven 
Romanticism. If all of them are true, then it is hard to believe that any plau­
sible case can be made for the claim that the normative pronouncements of 
Intuition-Driven Romanticism have real normative force—that they are 
norms that we (or anyone else) should take seriously.
C. SOME EXPERIMENTS EXPLORING CULTURAL VARIATION IN EPISTEMIC 
INTUITIONS
Are any of these hypotheses true? To try to find out we have been conduct­
ing a series of experiments designed to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. While the 
results we have so far are preliminary, they are sufficient, we think, to at 
least shift the burden of argument well over in the direction of the defender 
of IDR strategies. What our results show, we believe, is that the advocates 
of IDR can no longer simply ignore these hypotheses or dismiss them as 
implausible, for there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that 
they might well be true.
In designing our experiments, we were guided by three rather different 
considerations. First, we wanted our intuition probes—the cases that we
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would ask subjects to judge—to be similar to cases that have actually been 
used in the recent literature in epistemology. Second, since the findings 
reported by Nisbett and his colleagues all focused on differences between 
East Asians (henceforth, EAs) and European Americans (henceforth, Ws, 
for “Westerners”), we decided that would be the obvious place to look first 
for differences in epistemic intuitions. Third, since Nisbett and his col­
leagues argue that Ws are significantly more individualistic than EAs, who 
tend to be much more interdependent and “collectivist” and thus much more 
concerned about community harmony and consensus, we tried to construct 
some intuition probes that would tap into this difference. Would individual­
istic Ws, perhaps, be more inclined to attribute knowledge to people whose 
beliefs are reliably formed by processes that no one else in their community 
shares? The answer, it seems, is yes.
Truetemp Cases
An issue of great moment in recent analytic epistemology is the intemal- 
ism/extemalism debate. Intemalism, with respect to some epistemically 
evaluative property, is the view that only factors within an agent s intro­
spective grasp can be relevant to whether the agent s beliefs have that prop­
erty. Components of an agent’s doxastic situation available to introspection 
are intemalistically kosher; other factors beyond the scope of introspection, 
such as the reliability of the psychological mechanisms that actually pro­
duced the belief, are epistemically external to the agent. Inspired by 
Lehrer,25 we included in our surveys a number of cases designed to explore 
externalist/internalist dimensions of our subjects’ intuitions. Here is one of 
the questions we presented to our subjects, all of whom were undergradu­
ates at Rutgers University.26
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and 
his brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right 
whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. Charles is 
completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way.
A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that 
it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no 
other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that 
time 71 degrees in his room. Does Charles really know that it 
was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
Although Charles’s belief is produced by a reliable mechanism, it is stipu­
lated that he is completely unaware of this reliability. So his reliability is 
epistemically external. Therefore, to the extent that a subject population is 
unwilling to attribute knowledge in this case, we have evidence that the
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FIGURE 1: Individualistic Truetemp Case
group’s “folk epistemology” may be internalist. We found that while both 
groups were more likely to deny knowledge, EA subjects were much more 
likely to deny knowledge than were their W classmates. The results are 
shown in figure 1.21
After finding this highly significant difference, we began tinkering with 
the text to see if we could construct other “Truetemp” cases in which the 
diffeience between the two groups would disappear. Our first thought was 
to replace the rock with some socially sanctioned intervention. The text we 
used was as follows:
One day John is suddenly knocked out by a team of well-mean­
ing scientists sent by the elders of his community, and his brain 
is re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he 
estimates the temperature where he is. John is completely 
unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks 
later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 
degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other 
reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 
degrees in his room. Does John really know that it was 71 
degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
As we had predicted, the highly significant difference between the two 
groups disappeared. The results are shown in figure 2.
Encouraged by this finding we constructed yet another version of the 
“Truetemp” case in which the mechanism that reliably leads to a true belief 
is not unique to a single individual, but rather is shared by everyone else in 
the community. The intuition probe read as follows:
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FIGURE 2: The Elders Version
The Faluki are a large but tight knit community living on a 
remote island. One day, a radioactive meteor strikes the island 
and has one significant effect on the Faluki—it changes the 
chemical make-up of their brains so that they are always abso­
lutely right whenever they estimate the temperature. The Faluki 
are completely unaware that their brains have been altered in 
this way. Kal is a member of the Faluki community. A few 
weeks after the meteor strike, while Kal is walking along the 
beach, the changes in his brain lead him to believe that it is 71 
degrees where he is. Apart from his estimation, he has no other 
reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 
exactly 71 degrees where Kal is. Does Kal really know that it is 
71 degrees, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
As predicted, on this case too there was no significant difference between 
Ws and EAs (see fig. 3).
Intriguingly, though the difference is not statistically significant, the 
percentage of EAs who answered “Really Knows” in this case was greater 
than the percentage of Ws who gave that answer, reversing the pattern in the 
individualistic “hit by a rock” case. Figure 4, which is a comparison of the 
three Truetemp cases, illustrates the way in which the large difference 
between Ws and EAs in the Individualistic version disappears in the Elders 
version and looks to be reversing direction in the Faluki version.
G ettier Cases
A category of examples that has loomed large in the recent epistemology 














FIGURE 4: Comparison of Truetemp Cases
happens, false, or only accidentally true, or in some other way warrant 
deprived) evidence for a belief which is true. These cases are, of course, by 
their very construction in many ways quite similar to unproblematic cases 
in which a person has good and true evidence for a true belief. As 
Norenzayan and Nisbett have shown, EAs are more inclined than Ws to 
make categorical judgments on the basis of similarity. Ws, on the other 
hand, are more disposed to focus on causation in describing the world and 
classifying things.28 In a large class of Gettier cases, the evidence that
4 4 2
causes the target to form a belief turns out to be false. This suggest that EAs 
might be much less inclined than Ws to withhold the attribution of knowl­
edge in Gettier cases. And, indeed, they are.
The intuition probe we used to explore cultural differences on Gettier 
cases was the following:
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.
Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not 
aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he 
is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which 
is a different kind of American car. Does Bob really know that 
Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
The striking finding in this case is that a large majority of Ws give the stan­
dard answer in the philosophical literature, viz., “Only Believes.” But 
among EAs this pattern is actually reversed! A majority of EAs say that Bob 
really knows. The results are shown in figure 5.
Evidence from  Another Ethnic Group
The experiments we have reported thus far were done in lower division 
classes and large lectures at Rutgers. Since Rutgers is the State University 
of New Jersey and New Jersey is home to many people of Indian, Pakistani, 
and Bangladeshi descent, in the course of the experiments we collected lots 
of data about these people’s intuitions. Initially we simply set these data 
aside since we had no theoretical basis for expecting that the epistemic intu­
itions of people from the Indian subcontinent (hereafter SCs) would be
FIGURE 5: Gettier Case, Western and East Asian
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systematically different from the epistemic intuitions of Westerners. But, 
after finding the extraordinary differences between Ws and EAs on the 
Gettier case, we thought it might be interesting to analyze the SC data as 
well. We were right. It turns out that the epistemic intuitions of SCs are even 
more different from the intuitions of Ws than the intuitions of EAs are. The 
SC results on the Gettier case are shown in figure 6. If these results are 
robust, then it seems that what counts as knowledge on the banks of the 
Ganges does not count as knowledge on the banks of the Mississippi!
There were two additional intuition probes that we used in our initial 
experiments which did not yield statistically significant differences between 
Ws and EAs. But when we analyzed the SC data, it turned out that there 
were significant differences between Ws and SCs. The text for one of these 
probes, the Cancer Conspiracy case, was as follows:
It’s clear that smoking cigarettes increases the likelihood of get­
ting cancer. However, there is now a great deal of evidence that 
just using nicotine by itself without smoking (for instance, by 
taking a nicotine pill) does not increase the likelihood of getting 
cancer. Jim knows about this evidence and as a result, he 
believes that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of 
getting cancer. It is possible that the tobacco companies dishon­
estly made up and publicized this evidence that using nicotine 
does not increase the likelihood of cancer, and that the evidence 
is really false and misleading. Now, the tobacco companies did 
not actually make up this evidence, but Jim is not aware of this 
fact. Does Jim really know that using nicotine doesn’t increase 
the likelihood of getting cancer, or does he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES 
The results are shown in figure 7.
FIGURE 6: Gettier Case, Western and Indian
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Western Indian subcontinent
FIGURE 7: Conspiracy Case
The other probe that produced significant differences is a version of
Dretske’s Zebra-in-Zoo case29:
Mike is a young man visiting the zoo with his son, and when 
they come to the zebra cage, Mike points to the animal and says,
“that’s a zebra.” Mike is right—it is a zebra. However, as the 
older people in his community know, there are lots of ways that 
people can be tricked into believing things that aren’t true.
Indeed, the older people in the community know that it’s possi­
ble that zoo authorities could cleverly disguise mules to look 
just like zebras, and people viewing the animals would not be 
able to tell the difference. If the animal that Mike called a zebra 
had really been such a cleverly painted mule, Mike still would 
have thought that it was a zebra. Does Mike really know that the 
animal is a zebra, or does he only believe that it is?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
The results are shown in Figure 8.
What’s going on in these last two cases? Why do SCs and Ws have dif­
ferent epistemic intuitions about them? The answer, to be quite frank, is that 
we are not sure how to explain these results. But, of course, for our polem­
ical purposes, an explanatory hypothesis is not really essential. The mere 
fact that Ws, EAs, and SCs have different epistemic intuitions is enough to 
make it plausible that IDR strategies which take these intuitions as inputs 
would yield significantly different normative pronouncements as output. 
And this, we think, puts the ball squarely in the court of the defenders of 
IDR strategies. They must either argue that intuitive differences of the sort 
we’ve found would not lead to diverging normative claims, or they must 
argue that the outputs of an IDR strategy are genuinely normative despite
FIGURE 8: Zebra Case
the fact that they are different for different cultures. Nor is this the end of the 
bad news for those who advocate IDR strategies.
Epistemic Intuitions and Socioeconomic Status
Encouraged by our findings in these cross-cultural studies, we have begun 
to explore the possibility that epistemic intuitions might also be sensitive to 
the socioeconomic status of the people offering the intuitions. And while our 
findings here are also quite preliminary, the apparent answer is that SES 
does indeed have a major impact on subjects’ epistemic intuitions.
Following Haidt (and much other research in social psychology) we 
used years of education to distinguish low and high SES groups. In the stud­
ies we will recount in this section, subjects were classified as low SES if 
they reported that they had never attended college. Subjects who reported 
that they had one or more years of college were coded as high SES. All the 
subjects were adults; they were approached near various commercial venues 
in downtown New Brunswick, New Jersey, and (since folks approached on 
the street tend to be rather less compliant than university undergraduates in 
classrooms) they were offered McDonald’s gift certificates worth a few dol­
lars if they agreed to participate in our study.
Interestingly, the two intuition probes for which we found significant 
SES differences both required the subjects to assess the importance of pos­
sible states of affairs that do not actually obtain. Here is the first probe, 
which is similar to the Dretske-type case discussed above:
Pat is at the zoo with his son, and when they come to the zebra 
cage, Pat points to the animal and says, “that’s a zebra.” Pat is 
right—it is a zebra. However, given the distance the spectators 
are from the cage, Pat would not be able to tell the difference
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FIGURE 9: Zebra Case
between a real zebra and a mule that is cleverly disguised to 
look like a zebra. And if the animal had really been a cleverly 
disguised mule, Pat still would have thought that it was a zebra.
Does Pat really know that the animal is a zebra, or does he only 
believe that it is?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES 
The results are shown in figure 9.
The second probe that produced significant (indeed enormous) differences 
between our two SES groups was the Cancer Conspiracy case that also gen­
erated differences between Western subjects and subjects from the Indian 
subcontinent. The results are shown in figure 10.
Why are the intuitions in these two SES groups so different? Here again 
we do not have a well-worked-out theoretical framework of the sort that 
Nisbett and his colleagues have provided for the W vs. EA differences. So 
any answer we offer is only a speculation. One hypothesis is that one of the 
many factors that subjects are sensitive to in forming epistemic intuitions of 
this sort is the extent to which possible but nonactual states of affairs are rel­
evant. Another possibility is that high SES subjects accept much weaker 
knowledge-defeaters than low SES subjects because low SES subjects have 
lower minimum standards for knowledge. More research is needed to deter­
mine whether either of these conjectures is correct. But whatever the expla­
nation turns out to be, the data we’ve reported look to be yet another serious 
embarrassment for the advocates of IDR. As in the case of cultural differ­
ence, they must either argue that these intuitive differences, when plugged 
into an IDR black box, would not lead to different normative conclusions, 
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FIGURE 10: Cancer Conspiracy Case
genuinely normative, and thus that the sorts of doxastic states that ought to 
be pursued by relatively rich and well-educated people are significantly dif­
ferent from the sorts of doxastic states that poor and less well educated folks 
should seek. We don’t pretend to have an argument showing that neither of 
these options is defensible. But we certainly don’t envy the predicament of 
the IDR advocate who has to opt for one or the other.30
In this section we propose to assemble some objections to the case against 
IDR that we’ve set out in the preceding sections along with our replies.
A. WHAT’S SO BAD ABOUT EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM?
Objection:
Suppose we’re right. Suppose that epistemic intuitions do differ in different 
ethnic and SES groups, and that because of this IDR strategies will generate 
different normative conclusions depending on which group uses them. Why, 
the critic asks, should this be considered a problem for IDR advocates? At 
most it shows that different epistemic norms apply to different groups, and 
thus lhat epistemic relativism is true. But why, exactly, is that a problem? 
What’s so bad about epistemic relativism? “Indeed,” we imagine the critic 
ending with an ad  hominem flourish, “one of the authors of this paper has 
published a book that defends epistemic relativism.”31
IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
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We certainly have no argument that could show that all forms of epistemic 
relativism are unacceptable, and the one avowed relativist among us is still 
prepared to defend some forms of relativism. But if we are right about epis­
temic intuitions, then the version of relativism to which IDR strategies lead 
would entail that the epistemic norms appropriate for the rich are quite dif­
ferent from the epistemic norms appropriate for the poor, and that the epis­
temic norms appropriate for white people are different from the norms 
appropriate for people of color.32 And that we take to be quite a preposter­
ous result. The fact that IDR strategies lead to this result is, we think, a very 
strong reason to think that there is something very wrong with those strate­
gies. Of course, a defender of an IDR strategy might simply bite the bullet 
and insist that the strategy he or she advocates is the right one for uncover­
ing genuine epistemic norms, despite the fact that it leads to a relativistic 
consequence that many find implausible. But the IDR advocate who 
responds to our data in this way surely must offer some argument for the 
claim that the preferred IDR strategy produces genuine epistemic norms. 
And we know of no arguments along these lines that are even remotely 
plausible.
B. THERE ARE SEVERAL SENSES OF “KNOWLEDGE”
Objection:
The next objection begins with the observation that epistemologists have 
long been aware that the word “knows” has more than one meaning in ordi­
nary discourse. Sometimes when people say that they “know” that some­
thing is the case, what they mean is that they have a strong sense of 
subjective certainty. So, for example, someone at a horse race might give 
voice to a strong hunch by saying: “I just know that Ivoiy Armchair is going 
to win.” And even after Lab Bench comes in first, this colloquial sense of 
“know” still permits them to say, “Drat! I just knew that Ivory Armchair was 
going to win.” At other times, though, when people use “know” and 
“knowledge” the sense they have in mind is the one that is of interest to 
epistemologists. The problem with our results, this objection maintains, is 
that we did nothing to ensure that when subjects answered “Really Know” 
rather than “Only Believe” the sense of “know” that they had in mind was 
the one of philosophical interest rather then the subjective certainty sense. 
“So,” the critic concludes, “for all you know, your subjects might have been 





It is certainly possible that some of our subjects were interpreting the 
“Really Know” option as a question about subjective certainty. But there is 
reason to think that this did not have a major impact on our findings. For all 
of our subject groups (W, EA, and SC in the ethnic studies and high and low 
SES in the SES study) we included a question designed to uncover any sys­
tematic differences in our subjects’ inclination to treat mere subjective cer­
tainty as knowledge. The question we used was the following:
Dave likes to play a game with flipping a coin. He sometimes 
gets a special feeling” that the next flip will come out heads.
When he gets this “special feeling,” he is right about half the 
time, and wrong about half the time. Just before the next flip,
Dave gets that “special feeling,” and the feeling leads him to 
believe that the coin will land heads. He flips the coin, and it 
does land heads. Did Dave really know that the coin was going 
to land heads, or did he only believe it?
REALLY KNOWS ONLY BELIEVES
As shown in figure 11, there was no difference at all between the high and 
low SES groups on this question; in both groups almost none of our subjects 
judged that this was a case of knowledge. The results in the ethnic studies 
were basically the same.33
This might be a good place to elaborate a bit on what we are and are not 
claiming about epistemic intuitions and the psychological mechanisms or 
“knowledge structures” that may subserve them. For polemical purposes we 
have been emphasizing the diversity of epistemic intuitions in different eth­
nic and SES groups, since these quite different intuitions, when plugged into 
an IDR black box, will generate different normative claims. But we certainly 
do not mean to suggest that epistemic intuitions are completely malleable or 
that there are no constraints on the sorts of epistemic intuitions that might be 
found in different social groups. Indeed, the fact that subjects from all the 
groups we studied agreed in not classifying beliefs based on “special feel­
ings” as knowledge suggests that there may well be a universal core to “folk 
epistemology.” Whether or not this conjecture is true and, if it is, how this 
common core is best characterized, are questions that will require a great 
deal more research. Obviously, these are not issues that can be settled from 
the philosopher’s armchair.
C. THE EFFECT SIZE WE’VE FOUND IS SMALL AND PHILOSOPHICALLY 
UNINTERESTING
Objection:
If it were the case that virtually all Ws judged various cases in one way and 
virtually all EAs or SCs judged the same cases in a different way, that might
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be genuine cause for concern among epistemologists. But that’s not at all 
what you have found. Rather, what you’ve shown is merely that in various 
cases there is a 20 or 30 percent difference in the judgments offered by sub­
jects in various groups. So, for example, a majority in all of your groups 
withhold knowledge attributions in all the Truetemp cases that were 
designed to test the degree to which subjects’ intuitions reflected epistemic 
intemalism. Since the majority in all groups agree, we can conclude that the 
correct account of epistemic norms is internalist. So it is far from clear why 
epistemologists should find the sort of cultural diversity you’ve found to be 
at all troubling, or even interesting.
Reply:
Here we have two replies. First, the sizes of the statistically significant 
group differences that we’ve reported are quite comparable with the size of 
the differences that Nisbett, Haidt, and other social psychologists take to 
show important differences between groups. The second reply is more 
important. While in some cases what we’ve been reporting are just the brute 
facts that intuitions in different groups differ, in other cases what we’ve 
found is considerably more interesting. The differences between Ws and 
EAs look to be both systematic and explainable. EAs and Ws appear to be 
sensitive to different features of the situation, different epistemic vectors, as 
we will call them. EAs are much more sensitive to communitarian factors, 
while Ws respond to more individualistic ones. Moreover, Nisbett and his 
colleagues have given us good reason to think that these kinds of differences 
can be traced to deep and important differences in EA and W cognition. And 
we have no reason to think that equally important differences could not be 
found for SCs. Our data also suggests that both high and low SES 
Westerners stress the individualistic and noncommunitarian vector, since 
there was no difference between high and low SES groups on questions 
designed to emphasize this vector. What separates high and low SES sub­
jects is some quite different vector—sensitivity to mere possibilities, per­
haps. What our studies point to, then, is more than just divergent epistemic 
intuitions across groups; the studies point to divergent epistemic concerns— 
concerns which appear to differ along a variety of dimensions. It is plausi­
ble to suppose that these differences would significantly affect the output of 
just about any IDR process.
D. WE ARE LOOKING AT THE WRONG SORT OF INTUITIONS; THE RIGHT SORT 
ARE ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR SENSE OF NECESSITY
Objection:
The central idea of this objection is that our experiments are simply not 
designed to evoke the right sort of intuitions—the sort that the IDR process 
really requires. What we are collecting in our experiments are unfiltered spon­
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taneous judgments about a variety of cases. But what is really needed, this 
objection maintains, are data about quite a different kind of intuitions. The 
right sort of intuitions are those that have modal import and are accompanied 
by a c lear sense of necessity. They are the kind of intuitions that we have when 
confronted with principles like: If p, then not-not-p. Unless you show cultural 
or SES diversity in these sorts of intuitions, this objection continues, you have 
not shown anything that an IDR advocate needs to be concerned about, since 
you have not shown that the right sort of intuitions are not universal.33
Reply:
It is true that the sorts of intuitions that our experiments collect are not the 
sorts that some IDR theorists would exploit. However, our findings do raise 
serious questions about the suggestion that intuitions which come with a 
clear sense of necessity and modal import— strong intuitions, as we propose 
to call them—are anything close to universal. Many epistemologists would 
no doubt insist that their own intuitions about many cases are strong intu­
itions. Simple Gettier case intuitions are a good example. Indeed, if these 
intuitions, which led a generation of epistemologists to seek something bet­
ter than the traditional justified true belief analysis of knowledge, are not 
strong intuitions, then it is hard to believe that there are enough strong intu­
itions around to generate epistemic norms of any interest. But if philoso­
phers’ intuitions on simple Gettier cases are strong intuitions, then our data 
indicate that strong intuitions are far from universal. For, while our experi­
ments cannot distinguish strong from weak intuitions, they do indicate that 
almost 30 percent of W subjects do not have either strong or weak intuitions 
that agree with those of most philosophers, since almost 30 percent of these 
subjects claim that, in our standard Gettier scenario, Bob really knows that 
Jill drives an American car. Among EA subjects, over 50 percent of subjects 
have the intuition (weak or strong) that Bob really knows, and among SC 
subjects the number is over 60! It may well be that upper-middle-class 
Westerners who have had a few years of graduate training in analytic phi­
losophy do indeed all have strong, modality-linked intuitions about Gettier 
cases. But since most of the world’s population apparently does not share 
these intuitions, it is hard to see why we should think that these intuitions 
tell us anything at all about the modal structure of reality, or about epistemic 
norms or indeed about anything else of philosophical interest.
E. WE ARE LOOKING AT THE WRONG SORT OF INTUITIONS; THE RIGHT SORT 
REQUIRE AT LEAST A MODICUM OF REFLECTION
Objection:
We have also heard a rather different objection about the type of intuitions 
examined in our study.35 The proper input intuitions for the IDR strategy, the
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critics maintain, are not “first-off” intuitions—which may be really little bet­
ter than mere guesses. Rather, IDR requires what might be called minimally 
reflective intuitions —intuitions resulting from some modicum of attention, 
consideration, and above all reflection on the particulars of the case at hand 
as well as one’s other theoretical commitments. We have, this objection con­
tinues, done nothing to show that such minimally reflective intuitions would 
exhibit the sort of diversity we have been reporting, and until we show 
something along those lines, the IDR theorist need not worry.
Reply:
This objection is right as far as it goes, since we have not (yet) examined 
intuitions produced under conditions of explicit reflection. But the objection 
really does not go very far, and certainly not far enough to allow IDR theo­
rists to rest easy. First of all, many of our subjects clearly did reflect at least 
minimally before answering, as evidenced in the many survey forms on 
which the subjects wrote brief explanatory comments after their answers. 
Moreover, as we stressed in Reply 4.C, it is not just that we found group dif­
ferences in epistemic intuition; much more interestingly, Western and East 
Asian subjects’ intuitions seem to respond to quite different epistemic vec­
tors. It is extremely likely that such differences in sensitivities would be 
recapitulated—or even strengthened—in any reflective process. If EA sub­
jects have an inclination to take into account factors involving community 
beliefs, practices, and traditions, and W subjects do not have such an incli­
nation, then we see no reason to expect that such vectors will not be differ­
entially present under conditions of explicit reflection. IDR theorists who 
want to make use of any purported difference between first-off and mini­
mally reflective intuitions had better go get some data  showing that such 
differences would point in the direction they would want.
F. WE ARE LOOKING AT THE WRONG SORT OF INTUITIONS; THE RIGHT SORT 
ARE THOSE THAT EMERGE AFTER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF DISCUSSION AND 
REFLECTION
Objection:
The last objection we’ll consider was proposed (though not, we suspect, 
endorsed) by Philip Kitcher. What IDR strategies need, this objection main­
tains, is neither first-off intuitions nor even minimally reflective intuitions, 
but rather the sorts of intuitions that people develop after a lengthy period 
of reflection and discussion—the sort of reflection and discussion that phi­
losophy traditionally encourages. Kitcher suggested that they be called 
Austinian intuitions.
Your experiments, the objection insists, do nothing to show that 
Austinian intuitions would exhibit the sort of cultural diversity you’ve found
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in first-off intuitions, or, indeed, that they would show any significant diver­
sity at all. When sensible people reflect and reason together, there is every 
reason to suppose that they will ultimately reach a meeting of the minds.
Reply:
We certainly concede that we have not shown that Austinian intuitions 
would not ultimately converge. However, to echo the theme of our previous 
reply, in the absence of any evidence we don’t think there is any reason to 
suppose that the sorts of marked cultural differences in sensitivity to epis­
temic vectors that our experiments have demonstrated would simply disap­
pear after reflection and discussion. Moreover, even if these cultural 
differences do dissipate after extended reflection, it might well be the case 
that they would be replaced by the sorts of order effects suggested in 
Section 3.B by our Hypothesis 4. If that hypothesis is correct, then the 
Austinian intuitions on which a group of reflective people would converge 
would depend, in part, on the order in which examples and arguments hap­
pened to be introduced. And different groups might well converge on quite 
different sets of Austinian intuitions which then proved quite impervious to 
change. Experiments demonstrating the sort of path dependence that we 
suggest in Hypothesis 4 are much harder to design than experiments demon­
strating cultural differences in initial intuitions. In the next stage of our 
ongoing empirical research on intuitions, we hope to run a series of experi­
ments that will indicate the extent to which the evolution of people’s intu­
itions is indeed a function of the order in which examples and 
counterexamples are encountered. Neither those experiments nor any of the 
evidence we’ve cited in this paper will suffice to demonstrate that Austinian 
intuitions or IDR processes that propose to use them will fail to converge. 
But, to end with the theme with which we began, our goal has not been to 
establish that IDR strategies will lead to very different (putatively) norma­
tive conclusions, but simply to make it plausible that they might. The 
assumption that they won’t is an empirical assumption; it is not an assump­
tion that can made without argument.
Our data indicate that when epistemologists advert to “our” intuitions 
when attempting to characterize epistemic concepts or draw normative con­
clusions, they are engaged in a culturally local endeavor—what we might 
think of as ethno-epistem ology. Indeed, in our studies, some of the most 
influential thought experiments of twentieth-century epistemology elicited 
different intuitions in different cultures. In light of this, Intuition-Driven 
Romanticism seems a rather bizarre way to determine the correct epistemic 
norms. For it is difficult to see why a process that relies heavily on epistemic 
intuitions that are local to one’s own cultural and socioeconomic group 
would lead to genuinely normative conclusions. Pending a detailed response
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to this problem, we think that the best reaction to the high-SES Western phi­
losophy professor who tries to draw normative conclusions from the facts 
about “our” intuitions is to ask: What do you mean “we”?
NO TES
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A P P E N D IX
The Fisher Exact test was used to calculate statistical significance between groups. 
Individualistic Truetemp Case (Figure 1)
Really knows Only believes
Western 61 128
East Asian 3 22
The p-exact = 0.020114
Elders Truetemp Case (Figure 2)
Really knows Only believes
Western 77 140
East Asian 5 15
The p-exact = 0.131784
Community Wide Truetemp Case (Figure 3)
Really knows Only believes
Western 2 8
East Asian 10 21
The p-exact = 0.252681
G ettier Case: Western and East Asian (Figure 5)
Really knows Only believes
Western 17 49
East Asian 13 10
The p-exact = 0.006414
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Really knows Only believes 
Western 17 49
Indian subcontinental 14 9
The p-exact = 0.002407
Cancer Conspiracy Case: Western and Indian (Figure 7)
Really knows Only believes 
Western 7 59
Indian subcontinental 7 16
The p-exact = 0.025014
Zebra-in-Zoo Case: Western and Indian (Figure 8)
_______________ Really knows Only believes
Western 19 43
Indian subcontinental 12 12
The p-exact = 0.049898
Zebra-in-Zoo Case: Low and High SES (Figure 9)
_______________ Really knows Only believes
Low SES 8 16
High SES 4 30
The p-exact = 0.038246
Cancer Conspiracy Case: Low and High SES (Figure 10)
_______________ Really knows Only believes
Low SES 12 2
High SES 6 29
Gettier Case: Western and Indian (Figure 6)
The p-exact = 0.006778
___________Really knows Only believes
Low SES 3 32
High SES 3 21
The p-exact = 0.294004
Special Feeling Case: Western and East Asian (no figure)
Really knows Only believes
Western 2 59
East Asian 0 8 
The p-exact = 0.780051
Special Feeling Case: Low and High SES (Figure 11)
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